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This paper investigates a signaling entry deterrence model under learning-by-doing. We show
that a monopolist￿ s practice of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare
gains) when learning e⁄ects are present than when they are absent, making the intervention of
antitrust authorities less urgent. If, however, the welfare loss associated to entry deterrence is
still signi￿cant, and thus intervention is needed, our paper demonstrates that the incumbent￿ s
practice of entry deterrence is easier to detect by a regulator who does not have access to
accurate information about the incumbent￿ s pro￿t function. Learning-by-doing hence facilitates
the regulator￿ s ability to detect entry deterrence, thus suggesting its role as an ￿ally￿of antitrust
authorities.
Keywords: Learning-by-doing; Entry deterrence; Incomplete information; Spillovers.
JEL classification: L12, D82, D83.
￿We would like to thank seminar participants at Washington State University and the 9th Annual International
Industrial Organization Conference, especially Jia Yan and Hayley Chouinard, for their insightful comments and
suggestions.
yAddress: 111C Hulbert Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164. E-mail: anaespinola@wsu.edu.
zAddress: 103G Hulbert Hall, Washington State University. Pullman, WA 99164-6210. E-mail: fmunoz@wsu.edu.
Phone: (509) 335 8402. Fax: (509) 335 1173.
11 Introduction
Learning-by-doing has been empirically observed in multiple industries, such as aircraft manufac-
turing, shipbuilders, automobiles, and more recently, in the production of semiconductor memory
chips, cable TV markets and health care.1 The e⁄ect of learning-by-doing on ￿rms￿limit pricing
practices has not been theoretically studied. However, entry deterrence has been empirically found
in industries that are particularly characterized by signi￿cant learning-by-doing e⁄ects, such as
cable TV markets, Seamans (2010), and health-care, Dafny (2005). Learning e⁄ects are especially
relevant for the regulator. Indeed, distinguishing whether a ￿rm￿ s increase in production was due
to entry-deterrence motives or to bene￿t from learning-by-doing was a key issue in policy debates
about the ￿semiconductor wars￿ between the U.S. and Japan during the 1970s and 1980s; see
Flamm (1993 and 1996). In this context, our paper shows that, rather than hindering the ability of
the regulator to identify the practice of limit pricing, learning-by-doing can facilitate such a task.
Our paper investigates entry deterrence in industries where ￿rms bene￿t from learning-by-doing
and analyzes its welfare implications. We argue that the regulation of an incumbent practicing
limit pricing becomes less urgent in terms of social welfare when industries bene￿t from learning-
by-doing. In particular, this occurs because the ine¢ cient type of incumbent raises its production
during both periods in order to mimic the e¢ cient type but also to bene￿t from learning. Hence,
learning-by-doing raises consumer surplus not only in the ￿rst but in the second period, and as a
consequence the practice of limit pricing imposes a smaller welfare loss (or a larger welfare gain)
when learning e⁄ects are present. Therefore, from a regulatory viewpoint, our ￿ndings suggest that
the prohibition of limit pricing becomes less necessary when learning e⁄ects are large.
If the welfare loss associated to entry deterrence is signi￿cant, intervention by antitrust au-
thorities might still be necessary. In such case, we demonstrate that entry deterrence becomes
easier to detect by the regulator when learning e⁄ects are present. Speci￿cally, this occurs be-
cause the di⁄erence between the ￿rst-period output that the ine¢ cient incumbent selects under
incomplete information ￿ deterring entry in the market￿ and that under complete information
￿ attracting entry￿ expands as learning becomes more signi￿cant. The enlarging wedge between
these two output levels is especially useful for regulators holding inaccurate information about the
incumbent￿ s pro￿t function, since authorities cannot perfectly predict their true values, but only
con￿dence intervals around them. The lack of accurate information can be particularly problematic
when learning e⁄ects are absent. In such context, these output levels are potentially close to each
other, implying that the regulator￿ s con￿dence intervals can overlap, limiting its ability to identify
whether the incumbent is practicing limit pricing. If, in contrast, learning e⁄ects exist, these two
output levels are more distant from each other, reducing the potential for overlapping, which allows
antitrust authorities to more easily detect and prove limit pricing. This result highlights the role
1After the initial study by Wright (1936), who documented learning e⁄ects on the aircraft manufacturing industry,
multiple studies followed, such as Lane (1951) for shipbuilders, Hirsh (1952) and Balo⁄ (1966) for machine manu-
facturing, White (1977) for automobiles and, more recently, Gruber (1992) and Siebert (2010) for the production of
semiconductor memory chips, Gillett et. al. (2006) for cable TV markets and Waldman et al. (2003) for health care.
2of learning-by-doing as an ￿ally￿ of the regulator. Because learning e⁄ects can be expected to
become more signi￿cant in several technological industries ￿ such as semiconductor memory chips,
as documented by Gruber (1992) and Siebert (2010)￿ and in the compliance of environmental
regulation ￿ as shown by Monty (1991) and Dean and Brown (1995)￿ an understanding of this
role is both important and timely.
Our paper builds upon the literature on entry deterrence in signaling games, such as Milgrom
and Roberts (1982) and Matthews and Mirman (1983).2 Usual entry deterrence models, however,
assume that the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period action (e.g., price setting by a monopolist) does not
a⁄ect incumbent and entrant￿ s future pro￿ts. In our model, in contrast, the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-
period output reduces its future costs, thus increasing its second-period pro￿ts and decreasing the
entrant￿ s.3
In addition, our paper extends the literature on learning-by-doing by introducing asymmetric
information and signaling in an entry deterrence model. This literature, initiated by Spence (1981)
and Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) with models of complete information,4 was afterwards extended
to a context of symmetric incomplete information by Cabral and Riordan (1997), who analyze the
welfare consequences of predatory pricing in a setting of two ￿rms initially competing in the same
market. In particular, both ￿rms initially active in the industry cannot observe the ￿xed cost K
that one of the ￿rms must incur in order to remain active in the future, but observe its probability
distribution, i.e., ￿rms are symmetrically uninformed. Both ￿rms afterwards observe the realization
of the ￿xed cost K. Our paper identi￿es, however, an advantage of learning-by-doing that previous
papers in the literature did not consider, namely, facilitating the detection of entry deterrence
practices. In a recent article, Yang (2010) also examines the e⁄ect of learning in a limit-pricing
model. Despite the similarities, our paper di⁄er along several dimensions: ￿rst, we allow for general
pro￿ts functions (only considering linear demand in our parametric example); second, we explicitly
analyze how entry-deterrence practices are a⁄ected by learning (and therefore how easy they are
to be detected by uninformed regulators); ￿nally, we investigate the e⁄ect of allowing for learning
spillovers (di⁄usion in learning).
Section two describes the model and section three analyzes the signaling game under learning-
by-doing. We develop a parametric example similar to that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and
Cabral and Riordan (1997), in order to enhance the intuition behind the main results. Section four
discusses the implications of our ￿ndings in terms of welfare and antitrust policy and examine the
case in which learning spillovers exist. Finally, section ￿ve concludes.
2Harrington (1986) modi￿es Milgrom and Roberts￿(1982) model by allowing the possibility that the entrant is
uncertain about its own costs after entry. Interestingly, he shows that when the entrant￿ s and the incumbent￿ s costs
are su¢ ciently positively correlated then Milgrom and Roberts￿(1982) results are reversed. That is, the incumbent￿ s
production is below the simple monopoly output in order to strategically deter entry.
3Papers studying incomplete information settings where the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period action a⁄ects its future pro￿ts
include Bagwell and Ramey (1990), where ￿rms use advertising to signal their type, and Brander and Lewis (1986),
where ￿rms use debt as a signal.
4Other theoretical studies assuming complete information include Petrakis, Rasmusen and Roy (1997), Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1988), Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Hollis (2002). For a recent survey of the literature see Thompson
(2008).
32 Model
Consider an entry game with an incumbent (Firm 1) monopolist and an entrant (Firm 2) who
analyzes whether or not to join the market. The incumbent￿ s marginal costs are either high H or
low L, i.e., cH
1 > cL
1 > 0. We ￿rst examine the case where entrant and incumbent are informed
about each others￿marginal costs, and afterwards the case in which the entrant is uninformed about
the incumbent￿ s costs. Let us consider a two-stage game where, in the ￿rst stage, the incumbent
has monopoly power and selects an output level q. In the second stage a potential entrant decides
whether or not to enter. If entry occurs, agents compete as Cournot duopolists, simultaneously
selecting production levels x1 and x2, for the incumbent and entrant, respectively. Otherwise, the
incumbent maintains its monopoly power during both periods.










1 (q) is the pro￿t-maximizing second-period output and K = fH;Lg. The inverse demand
function p(￿) is decreasing and concave in output, satis￿es p(0) ￿ cK
1 , and is constant across
periods. The incumbent￿ s second-period marginal costs cK
1 (q) are weakly decreasing in ￿rst-period
output q, re￿ ecting the presence of learning-by-doing across periods. For simplicity, we consider
that learning-by-doing exhibits diminishing returns, i.e., cK
1 (q) decreases in q but at a decreasing
rate.5 If entry occurs, ￿rms compete as Cournot duopolists in the second period, with associated
equilibrium pro￿ts for the incumbent and entrant respectively,
DK
1 (q) ￿ max
x1
p(X)x1 ￿ cK
1 (q)x1 and DK
2 (q) ￿ max
x2
p(X)x2 ￿ c2x2 ￿ F
where X denotes aggregate second-period equilibrium output, cK
1 (q) < cK
1 for all q > 0, c2 = cH
1
represents the entrant￿ s marginal cost, and F denotes the ￿xed entry cost. To make the entry
decision interesting, assume that when the incumbent￿ s costs are low, entry is unpro￿table, whereas
when they are high entry is pro￿table, i.e., DL
2 (q) < 0 < DH
2 (q) for all q.6
First period, No entry. When the incumbent￿ s costs are low, entry does not occur. Hence,
the incumbent chooses a ￿rst-period output q that solves
max




where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the incumbent￿ s discount factor. A marginal increase in ￿rst-period
5Note that this allows for both linear and convex learning curves. For simplicity, we consider that the learning
curve of the high-cost incumbent lies above that of the low-cost ￿rm, which rules out that an initially ine¢ cient
incumbent becomes the e¢ cient ￿rm in the second period through learning.
6The incumbent￿ s capacity is hence limited, since the high-cost incumbent cannot produce a su¢ ciently large
amount during the ￿rst period in order to blockade entry, thus eliminating the informative role of ￿rst-period output.
4output not only produces an increase in marginal revenue but also raises second-period pro￿ts
provided the cost-reduction e⁄ect associated to learning.7 Let qL;NE denote the solution to the
above maximization problem with low costs, where NE represents that no entry occurs.
First period, Entry. When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, entry follows in the second period.
Hence, the incumbent chooses a ￿rst-period output q that solves
max
q p(q)q ￿ cH
1 q + ￿DH
1 (q).
In this case a marginal increase in ￿rst-period output produces not only a cost-reduction e⁄ect but
also a strategic e⁄ect since the entrant reduces its duopoly output when facing a more competitive
incumbent.8 Let qH;E denote the solution to the above maximization problem with high costs,
where the superscript E represents entry.
Example. Considering a linear inverse demand function p(q) = 1 ￿ q and no discounting,
￿ = 1. The incumbent￿ s marginal costs satisfy 1 > cH
1 > cL
1. In the second period, the incumbent￿ s
marginal costs, cK
1 (q) = cK
1 ￿ ￿q, decrease in learning-by-doing, where ￿ > 0 denotes the learning











4￿￿2 in the second and ￿rst period, respectively, both being increasing in














￿rst period.10 Finally, when learning is absent, ￿ = 0, second-period output coincides with that










3 , while the incumbent￿ s






In this section we investigate the case where the incumbent is privately informed about its marginal
costs, while the entrant only observes the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period output. The time structure of
this signaling game is as follows.
1. Nature decides the realization of the incumbent￿ s marginal costs, either high or low, with
probabilities p 2 (0;1) and 1￿p, respectively. The incumbent privately observes this realiza-
tion but the entrant does not.
7Note that the sum of these two bene￿ts is decreasing in q, provided that the inverse demand function is concave
in output and learning-by-doing exhibits diminishing returns. That is, further increases in ￿rst-period output induce
a decreasing marginal bene￿t across periods.
8We consider, for simplicity, that a given reduction in second-period costs produces a larger increase in the
incumbent￿ s pro￿ts when it maintains its monopoly power than when entry follows. This condition holds for most
parameter values under linear demand, as in the parametric example developed throughout the paper.




10Note that the second-order conditions for the incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period pro￿t-maximization problem requires
￿
2 < 9=4.
52. The incumbent chooses its ￿rst-period output level, q.
3. Observing the incumbent￿ s output decision, the entrant forms beliefs about the incumbent￿ s
initial marginal costs. Let ￿(cH
1 jq) denote the entrant￿ s posterior belief about the initial costs
being high after observing a particular ￿rst-period output from the incumbent q.
4. Given the above beliefs, the entrant decides whether or not to enter the industry.
5. If entry does not occur, the incumbent maintains its monopoly power, whereas if entry occurs,
both agents compete as Cournot duopolists and the entrant observes the incumbent￿ s type.11
3.1 Separating equilibrium
Let us next analyze the separating equilibrium where the incumbent selects a ￿rst-period output qH
when its costs are high, but chooses qL when its costs are low.12 Entrant￿ s equilibrium beliefs after
observing equilibrium output qH and qL are ￿(cH
1 jqH) = 1 and ￿(cH
1 jqL) = 0, respectively. The
entrant enters (stays out) when it infers that the incumbent￿ s initial cost are high (low, respectively).
First, we investigate the conditions that guarantee the existence of a separating equilibrium. When
its marginal costs are high, the incumbent selects the ￿rst-period output that maximizes its pro￿ts
across both periods given that entry occurs, qH;E. If the incumbent deviates towards the low-cost
incumbent￿ s output qL, it deters entry. Hence, the high-cost incumbent selects its equilibrium
output qH;E if MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH
1 (qH;E) ￿ MH
1 (qL) + ￿M
H
1 (qL) or equivalently,13
MH
1 (qH;E) ￿ MH








Likewise, if the low-cost incumbent chooses the equilibrium output qL, it deters entry. If
instead the incumbent deviates towards the high-cost incumbent￿ s output, qH;E, it attracts entry.
Conditional on entry, the low-cost incumbent can select an o⁄-the-equilibrium output qL;E 6= qH;E 6=
qL which maximizes its pro￿ts, yielding ML
1 (qL;E) + ￿DL
1 (qL;E). Thus, the low-cost incumbent





1 (qL;E), or equivalently,
ML
1 (qL;E) ￿ ML








The following proposition describes the only separating equilibrium of the signaling game that
survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion.
Proposition 1. A separating strategy pro￿le can be sustained as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(PBE) in the signaling game where:
11Note that if both ￿rms continue their competition in future periods and both can bene￿t from learning-by-doing
after becoming perfectly informed, then their output schedules would resemble those in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983).
12The separating output q
L is weakly higher than the production level that the low-cost incumbent selects under
complete information, q
L;NE. Otherwise, the high-cost incumbent could be tempted to pool with the low-cost
incumbent by selecting q
L;NE.
13Incentive compatibility condition C1 also guarantees that the high-cost incumbent does not have incentives to
deviate towards any o⁄-the-equilibrium output q such that q 6= q
H;E 6= q
L; see proof of Proposition 1.
61. In the ￿rst period, the high-cost incumbent selects qH;E and the low-cost chooses qL = qA,
where qA solves conditions C1 with equality, respectively, and qA > qL;NE;
2. The entrant enters only after observing qH;E, given equilibrium beliefs ￿(cH
1 jqH;E) = 1 and
￿(cH
1 jqA) = 0. For any o⁄-the-equilibrium output level q, where q 6= qH;E 6= qA, entrant￿ s
beliefs are ￿(cH






3. In the second period of the game, the incumbent selects an output x
K;m
1 (q) if entry does not
occur, and every ￿rm i = f1;2g chooses x
K;d
i (q) if entry occurs.
Therefore the high-cost incumbent selects a ￿rst-period output qH;E, which coincides with its
output under complete information; while the low-cost incumbent chooses qA, which is larger than
its output under complete information, qL;NE, in order to convey its cost structure to the entrant,
deterring it from entering.
A sensible measure of the overproduction that the low-cost incumbent practices in order to
convey its type to the potential entrant (and thus deter entry) is the distance between its output
choices under incomplete and complete information, qA ￿ qL;NE, i.e., its ￿separating e⁄ort.￿ A
natural question is whether the incumbent￿ s separating e⁄ort increases in learning. To answer
this question, note that learning produces two opposing e⁄ects. First, the incumbent￿ s complete
information output, qL;NE, increases in learning, reducing the separating e⁄ort for a given qA.
Second, the bene￿ts from deterring entry rise in learning,14 entailing a larger separating e⁄ort, for
a given qL;NE. When the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst, a stronger separating result can be
sustained under learning-by-doing. This occurs when returns from learning e⁄ects are relatively
strong. For standard functional forms, such as those in our next example, as well as in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1983) and Cabral and Riordan (1997), the separating e⁄ort is indeed increasing in
learning. Intuitively, since the incentives to deter entry for both types of incumbent are increasing
in learning, the low-cost incumbent is forced to enlarge the extent of its overproduction (i.e., its
separating e⁄ort) in order to convey its type to the potential entrant.





lowing ￿gure compares the separation result in standard entry-deterrence models without learning,
as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and the separating outcome under learning-by-doing described
in Proposition 1. Under no learning-by-doing, ￿ = 0, the low-cost incumbent raises its ￿rst-period
output from qL
monop = 0:33 under complete information to e qA = 0:43 under the separating equilib-
rium. Under learning by doing, e.g., ￿ = 1
3, the low-cost incumbent increases its ￿rst-period output
14The fact that entry-deterrence bene￿ts are increasing in learning can be con￿rmed by examining the right-hand


















is also increasing and concave in q
L for both types of incumbent. An increase in learning produces an increase in the
positive slope of the curve.
7from qL;NE = 0:4 under complete information to qA = 0:81 under the separating equilibrium,
implying a larger separating e⁄ort.15
Fig. 1. ￿Separating e⁄ort￿of the low-cost incumbent.
3.2 Pooling equilibrium
Let us describe the pooling equilibrium of the game, where both types of incumbent select the same
￿rst-period output.
Proposition 2. The following strategy pro￿le describes the pooling PBE in the entry deterrence
game that survive the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion:
1. In the ￿rst period, both types of incumbent select the same ￿rst-period output qL;NE;
2. The entrant does not enter after observing the equilibrium output qL;NE, but enters after
observing o⁄-the-equilibrium output q, q 6= qL;NE, given beliefs ￿(cH
1 jqL;NE) = p < p(qL;NE)
and ￿(cH
1 jq) = 1; and
3. In the second period of the game, the incumbent selects x
K;m
1 (q) if entry does not occur, and
every ￿rm i = f1;2g chooses x
K;d
i (q) if entry occurs.
Therefore, in the pooling equilibrium both types of incumbent produce the same ￿rst-period out-
put, qL;NE, which reveals no additional information to the entrant, thus deterring entry. Following
the same example as in the separating equilibrium, ￿gure 2 illustrates the increase in the high-cost
incumbent￿ s output, from qH;E under complete information to qL;NE in the pooling equilibrium, and
15Note that learning must be su¢ ciently low in order to guarantee that the entrant is willing to enter when the
incumbent￿ s costs are high. For the parameter values considered in the example, this implies that ￿ must be lower than
1=2. Otherwise, the ine¢ cient incumbent could increase ￿rst-period output until a level that makes entry unpro￿table,
i.e., using ￿rst-period production to blockade entry. Such setting would eliminate, however, the informative role of
￿rst-period production in the signaling game.
8how such increase grows in learning. For instance, qL;NE ￿ qH;E increases from 0:33 ￿ 0:25 = 0:08
when ￿ = 1
100 to 0:49 ￿ 0:33 = 0:16 when ￿ = 1
2. Intuitively, learning increases both types of
incumbent￿ s entry-deterrence bene￿ts, thus raising the incentives of the high-cost incumbent to
deter entry by mimicking the output level of the low-cost ￿rm, i.e., overproducing.
Fig. 2. Overproduction of the high-cost incumbent.
4 Discussion
Welfare comparison. Let us next evaluate social welfare under di⁄erent degrees of learning in
the separating equilibrium. When the incumbent￿ s costs are high, output coincides with that under
complete information, thus yielding the same welfare in both information contexts. When the
incumbent￿ s costs are low, in contrast, output schedules di⁄er. In particular, ￿rst-period output
is not only increased to bene￿t from learning (as under complete information), but also to deter
entry, which further increases consumer surplus across both periods. Therefore, learning produces
an increase in social welfare in the complete information setting, and this increase is emphasized in
the separating equilibrium. The ￿rst column of the following table compares social welfare between
the separating equilibrium and the complete information setting in our previous example. Further
increases in learning emphasize the welfare advantage of the separating equilibrium.16 Standard
entry-deterrence models with signaling show that the incumbent￿ s incentives to deter entry can
actually improve social welfare relative to the complete information context. Our results hence
suggest that such positive e⁄ect on welfare can be augmented as learning becomes more signi￿cant.
16Other parameter combinations produce similar welfare comparisons and can be provided by the authors upon
request.







Table I. Comparison of social welfare between incomplete and complete information
We next evaluate the welfare consequences of learning in the pooling equilibrium of the game. In
the case of low costs, the incumbent produces the same output as under complete information and
thus social welfare is una⁄ected by the information structure of the game. When costs are high, the
incumbent selects a higher level of output, qL;NE, than in the complete information setting, qH;E, in
order to deter entry. This increases consumer surplus during the ￿rst period, but reduces it during
the second period since the high-cost incumbent maintains its monopoly power. On one hand,
learning increases in the ￿rst-period welfare gain, since the high-cost incumbent produces more.
On the other hand, learning reduces the second-period welfare loss, because a larger production in
the ￿rst-period decreases the incumbent￿ s second-period costs, leading to an increase in output. An
increase in learning-by-doing therefore expands the set of parameter values under which the pooling
equilibrium of the game is welfare improving, relative to complete information. The second column
of Table I illustrates this result for di⁄erent degrees of learning. From a regulatory standpoint, the
high-cost incumbent￿ s practice of limit pricing imposes a smaller welfare loss (or a larger welfare
gain) when learning e⁄ects are present than when they are absent.17
Antitrust policy. In the case that both types of incumbent pool selecting the same ￿rst-period
output level, qL;NE, our results suggest that regulation becomes less urgent when learning e⁄ects
are strong. Nonetheless, if the welfare loss associated to the pooling equilibrium is still signi￿cant,
learning makes limit pricing by the high-cost incumbent more ￿visible￿to antitrust authorities. In
order to pool with the low-cost ￿rm, the high-cost incumbent must raise its production from qH;E
to qL;NE, where the distance between these two output levels increases in learning. Importantly, a
regulator who does not have access to accurate information about the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts, might
just have con￿dence intervals around the true value of qH;E and qL;NE. If learning e⁄ects are
small, these output levels are closer to each other, and hence con￿dence intervals could overlap,
not allowing the regulator to identify whether the incumbent is producing its complete information
output or if, instead, it is practicing limit pricing to deter potential entry. If learning e⁄ects are
large, however, these con￿dence intervals are less likely to overlap since qH;E and qL;NE are further
apart, permitting the antitrust authority to identify limit pricing. In summary, learning becomes
17This welfare analysis resembles that in Cabral and Riordan (1997), who consider predatory pricing between two
￿rms initially competing in the same market. In particular, they show that predatory pricing can be welfare improving
if the ￿rst-period welfare gain from a larger duopoly output o⁄sets the second-period welfare loss from monopoly
output. Similarly, in the pooling equilibrium of our model, we show that social welfare can actually increase relative
to complete information.
10an ￿ally￿of antitrust authorities seeking to avoid entry deterrence.
Di⁄usion in learning. In certain contexts the incumbent￿ s cumulative experience not only
bene￿ts itself but also the potential entrant.18 In this case, ￿rst-period output still produces a
cost-reducing e⁄ect, both under monopoly and duopoly. The incumbent￿ s strategic e⁄ect, however,
becomes smaller since the entrant does not reduce its duopoly output by the same amount as
it did when learning e⁄ects accrued only to the incumbent. This implies that, under complete
information, the low-cost incumbent still selects qL;NE since entry does not follow. In contrast, the
high-cost incumbent￿ s ￿rst-period output, qH;E, decreases in the degree of di⁄usion, given that the
incumbent￿ s incentive to reduce its second-period costs decreases. The introduction of di⁄usion,
hence, expands the wedge between qL;NE and qH;E. As a consequence, di⁄usion reduces the amount
of information that the regulator needs to detect the practice of limit pricing in the incomplete
information setting.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes entry deterrence models where the incumbent bene￿ts from learning-by-doing
and holds private information about its e¢ ciency level. We show that a monopolist￿ s practice
of entry deterrence imposes smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning e⁄ects
are present, making the intervention of antitrust authorities less urgent. If, however, the welfare
loss associated to entry deterrence is still large ￿ calling for the need of intervention￿ our paper
demonstrates that the incumbent￿ s practice of entry deterrence is easier to detect by the regulator,
i.e., learning-by-doing becomes an ￿ally￿of antitrust authorities. We then extend our results to the
case in which learning spillovers (di⁄usion) exits, showing that, under relatively general conditions,
our previous results are emphasized as di⁄usion increases.
Note that, for simplicity, we consider that incumbent￿ s and entrant￿ s costs are uncorrelated. In
certain industries, nonetheless, costs may be positively, as described in Harrington (1986). Under
no learning, the incentives of the e¢ cient incumbent to overproduce in order to reveal its low cost
are diminished. However, with learning-by-doing those results could reversed since overproduction
in the ￿rst period generates a cost advantage to the incumbent in the second-period game.
Finally, this paper considers a single entrant in a two-period model. Another venue of future
research is to allow for multiple entrants who sequentially choose whether to enter the industry.
If entrants are symmetric, the incumbent￿ s cost advantage increases as its production accumulates
over time, i.e., the incumbent moves down its learning curve, supporting our entry-deterrence result
under larger parameter conditions. Once such signi￿cant entry barriers have been built, entry is
18For empirical studies documenting di⁄usion in learning see Irwin and Klenow (1994) in semiconductors, Lieberman
(1989) in chemicals and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) in the adoption of high-yielding seed varieties. Many empirical
studies testing the presence of learning spillovers, however, have been controversial because of using industry-wide
as a proxy for ￿rm-speci￿c cumulative output; see Thompson (2008). Nonetheless and for completeness we analyze
di⁄usion in learning.
11not socially optimal, even if the incumbent was initially ine¢ cient, and regulation could be directed
towards pricing strategies given the incumbent￿ s monopolization of the market.
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1
Let us investigate the conditions under which ￿
￿ ￿ ML









For compactness, let M1(q;c1) denote monopoly second-period equilibrium pro￿ts as a function of
￿rst-period output, q, and the incumbent￿ s initial marginal cost, c1. Similarly, let D1(qE(c1);c1)
represent duopoly second-period equilibrium pro￿ts as a function of the ￿rst-period equilibrium
output that maximizes the incumbent￿ s pro￿ts given that entry follows, qE(c1). Hence, we next
show that the di⁄erence M1(q;c1)￿D1(qE(c1);c1) is decreasing in the initial cost c1. In particular,

































Note that if learning-by-doing is absent, then
@c1(qE(c1);c1)



























1(q;c1) ￿ 0 (A.2)
where the ￿rst term is negative given that xm
1 (q;c1) > xd
1(q;c1) for a given q and c1, and the second









@c1 > 0. Hence, condition A.2 holds
















1(q;c1) . Provided that condition A.2 holds, A.1 is also




@c1 > 0 is relatively small.












1 (q), which is
















1 (qL) ￿ DH
1 (qH;E)
i







, guaranteeing that the former does not cross the latter. ￿
126.2 Appendix 2 - Single Crossing Condition
Lemma A. The incumbent￿ s pro￿ts satisfy the single-crossing property under all parameter values













Proof. If entry does not occur, the high-cost incumbent￿ s pro￿ts are MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q), for a
given ￿rst-period output q, and for given monopoly pro￿t-maximizing output in the second period












1 ￿ MBK;m(q) ￿ cK
1 :
Hence, under no entry, the single-crossing property holds if the incumbent￿ s marginal pro￿ts from
raising q are larger for the low-cost than for the high-cost incumbent, i.e., MBL;m(q) ￿ cL
1 ￿
MBH;m(q)￿cH





















1 , where MR(q) ￿
@p(q)







































which holds by de￿nition given that
@c1
L(q)
@q < 0, x
L;m
1 (q) > x
H;m
1 (q), and cH
1 > cL
1. [Note that in
the case of no learning-by-doing,
@c1
K(q)
@q = 0, this condition reduces to cH
1 > cL
1, which is satis￿ed
by de￿nition.]
If entry occurs, the single-crossing property holds if the incumbent￿ s marginal pro￿t from raising





































































































where the left-hand side is negative. The ￿rst two terms in the right-hand side are negative. We can













13[Note that under no learning-by-doing,
@c1
L(q)
@q = 0, condition A.4 reduces to cH
1 > cL
1, which is also
satis￿ed by de￿nition.] ￿
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
First, note that entrant￿ s beliefs become ￿(cH
1 jqH) = 1 after observing an equilibrium output of
qH and ￿(cH
1 jqL) = 0 after observing the equilibrium qL, where qL 2
￿
qA;qB￿
. If the entrant
observes an o⁄-the-equilibrium output q 6= qH 6= qL, then Bayes￿rule does not specify a particular
o⁄-the-equilibrium belief, i.e., ￿(cH
1 jq) 2 [0;1], and for simplicity we assume ￿(cH
1 jq) = 1. Given
these beliefs, the entrant enters after observing an output qH since DH
2 (qH) > 0, but stays out
after observing qL given that 0 > DL
2 (0) > DL
2 (qL). After observing an o⁄-the-equilibrium output
q 6= qH 6= qL, the entrant enters if and only if its expected pro￿t from entering satis￿es
￿(cH
1 jq) ￿ DH
2 (q) + (1 ￿ ￿(cH
1 jq)) ￿ DL










2 (q) > 0, implying DH
2 (q) ￿ DL
2 (q) > ￿DL
2 (q). And since both sides of the inequality are
positive, we can conclude that ￿(q) satis￿es ￿(q) 2 [0;1]:
Let us now examine the high-cost incumbent. By selecting the equilibrium output qH;E, the
high-cost incumbent obtains pro￿ts of MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH
1 (qH;E). First, note that qH;E maximizes
MH
1 (q)+￿DH
1 (q). Second, ￿rst-period output qH;E coincides with the equilibrium output that the
high-cost incumbent selects under complete information, yielding the same pro￿ts. By deviating
towards the low-cost incumbent￿ s equilibrium output, qL, the high-cost ￿rm obtains pro￿ts of
MH
1 (qL) + ￿M
H
1 (qL). Hence, the high-cost incumbent prefers to produce an equilibrium output
of qH;E rather than deviating towards qL if MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH
1 (qH;E) ￿ MH





1 (qH;E) ￿ MH








If instead the high-cost incumbent deviates towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium output of q 6= qH 6=
qL then entry follows, yielding pro￿ts of MH
1 (q) + ￿DH
1 (q), which do not exceed its equilibrium
pro￿ts of MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH
1 (qH;E).
Let us now turn to the low-cost incumbent. Selecting the equilibrium ￿rst-period output qL
yields ML
1 (qL) + ￿M
L
1(qL). By deviating towards the high-cost incumbent￿ s equilibrium output,
qH;E, the low-cost incumbent attracts entry, obtaining pro￿ts of ML
1 (qH;E)+￿DL
1 (qH;E). Therefore,
the low-cost incumbent selects an equilibrium output of qL rather than deviating towards qH;E if
ML
1 (qL) + ￿M
L
1(qL) ￿ ML
1 (qH;E) + ￿DL
1 (qH;E) (A.5)
If instead the low-cost incumbent deviates towards any o⁄-the-equilibrium output of q 6= qH 6=
14qL then entry follows and therefore the incumbent selects the value of q that maximizes pro￿ts
after entry ML
1 (q) + ￿DL
1 (q). Let qL;E denote the solution to this maximization problem, yielding
pro￿ts of ML
1 (qL;E)+￿DL
1 (qL;E). Hence, the low-cost incumbent chooses an equilibrium output qL
rather than deviating towards qL;E if
ML
1 (qL) + ￿M
L
1(qL) ￿ ML
1 (qL;E) + ￿DL
1 (qL;E) (A.6)
Note that condition A.6 implies A.5 since ML
1 (qL;E) + ￿DL
1 (qL;E) > ML
1 (qH;E) + ￿DL
1 (qH;E),
given that qL;E maximizes the low-cost incumbent￿ s pro￿ts across both periods given entry. There-
fore, condition A.6 becomes the condition that must be satis￿ed in order to guarantee that the
low-cost incumbent does not deviate from its equilibrium output of qL. Let us rewrite this condi-
tion as follows
ML
1 (qL;E) ￿ ML








Intuitive Criterion. Let us start considering the case in which the low-cost incumbent
produces a ￿rst-period output of qB. Let us ￿rst check if a deviation towards q 2 (qA;qB) is
equilibrium dominated for either type of incumbent. On one hand, the highest pro￿t that the
high-cost incumbent can obtain deviating towards q 2 (qA;qB) occurs when entry does not fol-
low. In such case, the high-cost incumbent obtains MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q). Hence, it deviates only if
MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q) > MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH
1 (qH;E). But condition C1 guarantees that this inequality
does not hold for any q 2 (qA;qB). Hence, the high-cost incumbent does not have incentives to
deviate from qH;E to q 2 (qA;qB).
On the other hand, the highest pro￿t that the low-cost incumbent can obtain from deviating
towards q 2 (qA;qB) occurs when entry does not follow. In such case, the low-cost incumbent￿ s
payo⁄ is ML
1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿ts of ML




1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q) reaches its maximum at qL;NE and qL;NE ￿ qL < qB. Therefore, the low-cost
incumbent has incentive to deviate from qB to q 2 (qA;qB).
Hence, after observing a ￿rst-period output of q 2 (qA;qB), the entrant concentrates its posterior
beliefs on the incumbent￿ s costs being low, i.e., ￿(cH
1 jq) = 0, and does not enter. Given these
updated beliefs, the low-cost incumbent obtains ML
1 (q)+￿M
L
1(q) from selecting an output q, which
exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t from output qB. Thus, the low-cost incumbent deviates from qB, and
the separating equilibrium in which it selects qB violates the Intuitive Criterion. A similar argument
is applicable for all separating equilibria in which the low-cost incumbent selects q 2 (qA;qB],
concluding that all of them violate the Intuitive Criterion.
Finally, let us check if the separating equilibrium in which the low-cost incumbent chooses
qA survives the Intuitive Criterion. If the low-cost incumbent deviates towards q 2 (qA;qB] the
highest pro￿t that it can obtain is ML
1 (q) + ￿M
L




1(qA). If instead, it deviates towards q < qA, the highest payo⁄ that it can obtain is
ML
1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t for all q 2 [qL;NE;qA). Hence, the low-cost
incumbent has incentives to deviate. Let us now check if the high-cost incumbent also has incentives




exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t if MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q) > MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH










1 (qH;E) ￿ MH
1 (q)
which is satis￿ed for all q < qA (see ￿gure 1). Hence, the high-cost incumbent also has incentives
to deviate towards q 2 [qL;NE;qA).
This implies that, after a deviation in q 2 [qL;NE;qA), the entrant cannot update its prior beliefs,
and chooses enter if its expected pro￿t from entering satis￿es p ￿ DH
2 (q) + (1 ￿ p) ￿ DL





2 (q) ￿ DL
2 (q)
￿ p(q)
where p(q) 2 (0;1) by de￿nition. Hence, if p ￿ p(q) entry occurs, yielding pro￿ts of ML
1 (q)+￿DL
1 (q)




Indeed, from C2 we know that ML
1 (qA) + ￿M
L
1(qA) ￿ ML
1 (qL;E) + ￿DL
1 (qL;E). Since, in addition,
qL;E is the argmax of ML
1 (q) + ￿DL
1 (q), then ML
1 (qA) + ￿M
L
1(qA) ￿ ML
1 (q) + ￿DL
1 (q) for any
deviation q. Therefore, the low-cost incumbent does not deviate from qA. Regarding the high-
cost incumbent, it obtains pro￿ts of MH
1 (q) + ￿DH
1 (q) by deviating towards q, which are below
its equilibrium pro￿ts of MH
1 (qH;E) + ￿DH
1 (qH;E) since qH;E is the argmax of MH
1 (q) + ￿DH
1 (q).
Hence, the high-cost incumbent does not deviate towards q either, and the separating equilibrium
survives the Intuitive Criterion for p > p(q).
If p < p(q), then entry does not occur, yielding pro￿ts ML
1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q) for the low-cost
incumbent, which exceed its equilibrium pro￿ts of ML
1 (qA)+￿M
L
1(qA) since q 2 [qL;NE;qA). Then,
the separating equilibrium in which the low-cost incumbent selects qA violates the Intuitive Criterion
if p < p(q). ￿
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2











= 1￿p, which coincide with the prior probability distribution over types.
In addition, o⁄-the-equilibrium beliefs cannot be identi￿ed using Bayes￿rule, and for simplicity let




= 1. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1,
these beliefs induce the entrant to enter after observing q0. Otherwise the entrant stays out. In
particular, after observing q, the entrant enters if and only if pDH
2 (q) + (1 ￿ p)DL









2 (q) > 0, implying that DH
2 (q) ￿ DL
2 (q) > ￿DL
2 (q), and since both sides of the inequality
are positive, we can conclude that the entrant enters if p > p(q), and stays out otherwise. Note that
if entry occurs after q, this induces every type of incumbent to select qK;E. But since qH;E 6= qL;E
16this strategy pro￿le cannot be a pooling equilibrium. Hence, it must be that p < p(q) inducing the
entrant to stay out. Let us check under which conditions the high-cost incumbent does not deviate
from q. By selecting q, it deters entry obtaining MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q). By deviating towards q0 6= q
it attracts entry, yielding a payo⁄ of MH
1 (q0) + ￿DH
1 (q0), which is maximized at qH;E. Hence, the
high-cost incumbent does not deviate from q if,
MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q) ￿ MH




1 (qH;E) ￿ MH








and similarly, for the low-cost incumbent,
ML
1 (qL;E) ￿ ML








Hence, any q simultaneously satisfying both of the above C1￿and C2 conditions for the high and
low-cost incumbents constitutes a pooling equilibrium ￿rst-period output of the signaling game.
Intuitive Criterion. Case 1. Let us now check if the pooling ￿rst-period output q = qL;NE
survives the Cho and Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. Let us ￿rst check if such output level is
equilibrium dominated for either type of incumbent. On one hand, the low-cost incumbent obtains






1(qL;NE). By deviating towards an o⁄-the-equilibrium
output level q0 such that q0 6= qL;NE the highest payo⁄that the low-cost incumbent can obtain occurs
when entry is deterred, yielding payo⁄s of ML
1 (q0)+￿M
L




1(q0) reaches its maximum at exactly q0 = qL;NE. Hence, the low-cost incumbent
does not have incentives to deviate from the pooling output q = qL;NE. On the other hand, the






1 (qL;NE). By deviating
towards q0 6= qL;NE the highest payo⁄ that the high-cost incumbent can obtain occurs when entry
is deterred, yielding payo⁄s of MH
1 (q0) + ￿M
H
1 (q0). Therefore, the high-cost incumbent does not






1 (qL;NE) ￿ MH
1 (q0) + ￿M
H
1 (q0), which only holds
for q0 2 (qH;NE;qL;NE). Hence, the entrant assigns full probability to the cost being high for every




= 1, whereas its updated beliefs are una⁄ected after
observing any other deviation. Thus, after observing q0 2 (qH;NE;qL;NE), the entrant believes that
such deviation can only come from a high-cost incumbent and enters. The high-cost incumbent￿ s
pro￿ts from deviating towards q0 are hence MH
1 (q0)+￿DH








1 (qL;NE) ￿ MH
1 (q0) + ￿DH
1 (q0): (A.7)
Note that deviation pro￿ts, MH
1 (q0) + ￿DH































1 (qL;NE) ￿ DH
1 (qH;E)
i
which is satis￿ed since qL;NE < qA. Therefore, the high-cost incumbent does not have incentives
to deviate either, and the pooling PBE in which q = qL;NE survives the Intuitive Criterion.
Case 2. Let us next check if the pooling ￿rst-period output q > qL;NE survives the Cho and
Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. On one hand, the low-cost incumbent obtains ML
1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q)
in equilibrium. By instead deviating towards qL;NE, the highest pro￿t that it can obtain occurs














1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q), which is true by concavity since q >
qL;NE. On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent obtains MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H
1 (q) in equilibrium. By







1 (qL;NE), which exceed its equilibrium pro￿ts since MH









1 (qL;NE), given that qH;NE < qL;NE < q and concavity. Therefore, both types





= p inducing no entry. Given these beliefs, both types of incumbent deviate toward
qL;NE, obtaining higher pro￿ts than in equilibrium. Hence, the pooling strategy pro￿le in which
both types select q > qL;NE violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Case 3. Let us ￿nally check if the pooling ￿rst-period output q < qL;NE survives the Cho and
Kreps￿(1987) Intuitive Criterion. Let us ￿rst consider the case where q < qH;NE < qL;NE. On
one hand, the low-cost incumbent obtains ML
1 (q) + ￿M
L
1(q) in equilibrium. By instead deviating
towards q0 6= q, the highest pro￿t it can obtain is ML
1 (q0)+￿M
L
1(q0), which exceeds its equilibrium
pro￿t if q0 2 (q;qL;NE] given the concavity of the ML
1 (q0) + ￿M
L
1(q0) function with respect to q0.
On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent obtains MH
1 (q)+￿M
H
1 (q) in equilibrium. By instead
deviating towards q0 6= q, the highest pro￿t that it can obtain is MH
1 (q0)+￿M
H
1 (q0), which exceeds





observing a deviation q0 2 (qH;NE;qL;NE]. (Otherwise, entrant￿ s beliefs are una⁄ected, since either
both types of incumbent have incentives to deviate or none of them has.) Therefore, after observing
a deviation q0 2 (qH;NE;qL;NE], the entrant believes that the incumbent￿ s cost must be low, and
does not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the low-cost incumbent￿ s pro￿t from deviating exceeds
its pooling equilibrium pro￿ts. Hence, the low-cost incumbent deviates towards q0. Therefore, the
pooling PBE where q < qH;NE < qL;NE violates the Intuitive Criterion.
Let us check if the pooling ￿rst-period output q satisfying qH;NE < q < qL;NE survives the
Intuitive Criterion. On one hand, the highest payo⁄ that the low-cost incumbent can obtain by
deviating towards q0 6= q is ML
1 (q0) + ￿M
L




1(q) if q0 2 (q;qL;NE]. On the other hand, the highest payo⁄ that the high-cost ￿rm can
obtain by deviating towards q0 6= q is MH
1 (q0) + ￿M
H
1 (q0), which exceeds its equilibrium pro￿t
of MH
1 (q) + ￿M
H





observing a deviation q0 2 (q;qL;NE], since only the low-cost incumbent has incentives to deviate
18to this range of output, inducing the entrant to not enter. Under these updated beliefs, the low-
cost incumbent￿ s pro￿t from deviating exceeds its pooling equilibrium pro￿ts. Hence, the low-cost
incumbent deviates towards q0 and the pooling PBE where qH;NE < q < qL;NE violates the Intuitive
Criterion. ￿
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